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ABSTRAcT
This paper predicts the dynamic model of the bank lending channel under Basel II regulatory constraints with monopolistic 
competition. The two-period model is chosen in order to demonstrate the effects of new Basel capital constraints on 
the risks of banks assets during both periods; and the amount of equity in the second period. The prediction of period 
one and two are shown to have the same effect and the only difference is the constraint. The regulatory constraint in 
periods one and two are predicted depending on the regulatory parameters and constraints for both periods. Thus, 
the effect of optimal rates on a policy rate is felt greater or less during the first period than during the second period, 
which means tightening capital requirements increases or decreases the risks of assets and banks taking higher or 
lower risks, respectively,during the first period than during the second period.
Keywords: Basel II; Bellman equation; two period model; bank lending channel.
ABSTRAK
Kajian ini menganggarkan model dinamik saluran pinjaman bank di bawah kekangan regulatori Basel II dengan 
persaingan monopoli. Model dua tempoh ini dipilih untuk menunjukkan kesan kekangan modal Basel yang baru 
terhadap aset bank di kedua-dua tempoh tersebut dan juga jumlah ekuiti di tempoh kedua. Penganggaran bagi tempoh 
pertama dan kedua ditunjukkan mempunyai kesan yang sama dan yang membezakannya adalah kekangan. Kekangan 
regulatori bagi tempoh pertama dan kedua dianggarkan bergantung kepada parameter regulatori dan kekangan kedua-
dua tempoh. Maka, kesan kadar optimum bagi kadar faedah diperolehi kesannya lebih atau kurang semasa tempoh 
pertama daripada tempoh kedua. Ini bermaksud pengetatan keperluan modal meningkatkan atau mengurangkan risiko 
asset dan bank menghadapi risiko yang tinggi atau rendah semasa tempoh pertama daripada tempoh kedua.
Kata kunci: Basel II; persamaan Bellman; model dua tempoh; saluran pinjaman bank.
INTRODUCTION
The main objective of the present study is to predict the 
dynamic model of the bank lending channel under Basel 
II regulatory constraints with monopolistic competition, 
which was originally analysed by Kishan and Opiela 
(2000) and Baglioni (2007) using a static model. The 
two period model is chosen in order demonstrate the 
effect of new capital constraints on the risks of bank 
assets during both periods; and the amount of equity in 
the second period.
The present study expands upon extant studies in 
two principal manners. First, the present study explicitly 
considers the time period of banks by choosing interest 
rate charged on loans; the interest rate paid on deposits; 
and determining how much to borrow from the money 
market. Second, the present study predicts the different 
impacts of optimal rates on the effect of new regulatory 
constraints, monetary policies and credit risks for each 
period.
Malaysian banks implemented the Basel II regulatory 
constraints in the early part of 2008. The first phase of 
the Basel II regulatory constraints is the standard Internal 
Rating Based (IRB) approach. Under the standard IRB 
approach, exposure1 to banking institutions shall be 
accorded risk weights based on their external credit 
ratings, which can be in the form of either long-term 
or short-term ratings.2 Banks have always borrowed 
from the interbank market because the constraint of 
capital restricts the amount of loans and securities that 
can be offered to borrowers. The main role of the Basel 
II regulatory constraints is to prevent banks from any 
difficulties, such as bankruptcy and liquidity problems. 
On the other side, if banks always borrow from the 
interbank market, such banks are exposed to higher risk 
if the banksare unable to repay the borrowing.
The present study primarily contributes to literature 
concerning the dynamic model of bank lending channel 
under the Basel II regulatory constraints. The present 
study predicts the theoretical impact of bank rates on the 
monetary policy and regulatory constraint in two period 
models with monopolistic competition.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. 
Section 2 contains the literature review; and section 3 
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shows the theoretical model and the predictions. Finally, 
section 4 presents the overall findings of the study. The 
appendix contains all proofs and tables.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The dynamic model of the lending channel has not 
been discussed in detail. A transmission mechanism 
of monetary policy is important in determining the 
behaviour of the bank lending channel. Banks set their 
own interest rates and behave as though they exist in 
an environment of monopolistic competition. The two 
period model is chosen in order demonstrate the effect 
of new capital constraints on the risks of bank assets 
during both periods; and the amount of equity during 
the second period. 
It is vital to highlight the role of the new Basel 
regulatory constraints in the model employed in 
the present study because the new Basel regulatory 
constraints may result in different impacts on banks’ 
balance sheets. Why do banks need to be regulated? 
Banks are exposed to credit and liquidity risks. Banks 
are also faced with the possibility of borrowers defaulting 
on loan repayments; and not having enough cash to meet 
deposit withdrawals. The higher the risk of a bank’s assets 
(e.g., the ratio of loans to total assets), the more vulnerable 
the banks are likely to be.
Extant studies that are similar to the present study 
include Kishan and Opiela (2000), Baglioni (2007) and 
Honda (2004), who use a static model of bank lending 
channels under the Basel I Capital Accord of 1998 (Basel 
I). Jaques (2008), Ahmad (2006) and Kashyap and Stein 
(2004) analyse the adverse macroeconomics effect of 
Basel I, especially in regards to its procyclicality and 
the neglect of the endogeneity of financial risk. Jaques 
(2008) develops a theoretical model to examine how 
commercial loans of varying credit quality are likely to 
respond to an adverse capital shock under the Basel II 
regulatory constraints. The results of the study suggest 
low credit risk loans may actually increase with the 
increased differentiation of credit risk introduced by 
the revised standards under the Basel II regulatory 
constraints. Ahmad (2006) concludes that the new 
capital requirements can have both good and bad effects 
on the targeted financial institutions and markets. The 
recent study made by Boivin et al. (2010) reviews the 
empirical evidence concerning the changes in the effect 
of monetary policy actions on real activity and inflation; 
and present new evidence using a relatively unrestricted 
factor-augmented vector auto regression (FAVAR) and 
a DSGE model. The results indicate notable changes in 
policy behaviour (with policy more focused on price 
stability) and in the reduced form correlations of policy 
interest rates in relation to activity in the United States. 
Both approaches employed by Boivin et al. (2010) 
yield similar results. Additionally,due to competition 
on the assets side, Repullo and Suarez (2004) argue that 
banks eligible for the IRB approach have a competitive 
advantage in the provision of low-risk loans because the 
IRB approach has a lower capital requirement, while the 
less sophisticated banks have a competitive advantage in 
the provision of high risk loans because the standardised 
approach has a lower capital requirement.
The present study makes different findings due 
to the use of a methodology that differs in several 
important respects from those used by Jaques (2008), 
Ahmad (2006), Kashyap and Stein (2004), Repullo and 
Suarez (2004) and Kishan and Opiela (2000). First, 
the aforementioned studies analyse the bank lending 
channel by assuming that banks operate in an imperfect-
competitive market. According to the assumption of 
the aforementioned studies, the correct bank strategic 
variable is quantity instead of price. In other words, 
each bank decides its optimal volume of loans, taking, 
as given, the volumes of loans supplied by the other 
banks. The equilibrium price is the one that equates to 
the aggregate supply and demand for loans. However, 
the present research differs from the aforementioned 
studies since the present study assumes that each of 
the banks behave as if in monopolistic competition (an 
assumption inspired by Baglioni (2007) and Boivin et al. 
(2010)). This market structure is suitable for describing 
the market for bank loans, despite the presence of many 
players in the market, in which each of them retains 
the power of setting its own price at the desired level. 
The reason for choosing a monopolistic competition 
market over an imperfect competition market in the 
present analysis is that loans are not perfect substitutes 
to borrowers (a monopolistic competition market can 
be differentiated). Each bank has some market power in 
the market for loans (faces downward-sloped demand 
for loans with finite elasticity) and time deposits. The 
difference between the present analysis and the analysis 
of Boivin et al. (2010) is that the disaggregated data of 
banks are used and the behaviour of banks is analysed 
by changes in the policy rate. The study of Boivin et al. 
concentrates more on the changes of monetary policy 
actions in relation to real activity and inflation without 
looking into the behaviour of individual banks. 
Second, Jaques (2008) models bank competition on 
the asset side and ignores competition on the liabilities 
side. However, the present analysis considers competition 
on both the assets and liabilities of banks’ balance 
sheets. In other words, the present study examines 
whether small or large banks (bank size) become more 
or less competitive in engaging a higher or lower risk 
of loans and securities; and whether high or low risk 
loans/securities are more competitive under the Basel II 
regulatory constraints.
Third, a two period model is chosen in order to 
demonstrate the effect of the bank lending channel 
by setting bank prices as the optimal decisions in the 
different time periods. The two period model is chosen 
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over the infinite model in order to provide clear evidence 
of whether banks are holding more risky assets or less 
risky assets during the first and second periods when 
the new regulatory constraints are imposed at the start 
of period 1. This is essential especially to determine 
the amount of equity in the second period. If banks 
hold more risky assets (less risky assets) during the 
first period, the amount of equity during the second 
period will increase (decrease) if the investment is 
success. For example, if banks are assumed to impose 
new capital requirements at the start of period 1, 
tightening the capital requirements will either decrease 
the risk of assets (Blum 1999) or increases the risk of 
assets (Ahmad 2006) depending upon whether the new 
requirements motivate banks from taking lower risks or 
higher risks during the first and second periods. Thus, 
the two periods chosen are sufficient to demonstrate 
banks’ investment decisions during the first period,while 
all costs are paid and returns are received during the 
second period. The bank operation will continue over 
time if the model is assumed to be in the n-period or 
infinite horizon. However, this is not pursued since 
a two period model can sufficiently prove the main 
objective of the present study. Miyake and Nakamura 
(2007) conclude that the timing of the introduction of 
tight regulations is important. If the regulations become 
tighter when a negative productivity shock occurs, 
the economy falls into a long and severe slump. This 
is consistent with the state of the Japanese economy 
after experiencing the bubble economy in 2007. In 
addition, Naceur (2009) investigates the effects of 
capital regulations on the cost of intermediation and 
profitability. The study finds a higher capital adequacy 
increase in the interest rate of shareholders in managing 
banks’ portfolios. The reduction in economic activity 
has opposite effects on banks’ profitability.
THEORETICAL MODEL
The present study examines a dynamic balance sheet 
model of bank lending and portfolio decisions. Banks 
invest in loans and securities while obtaining funds 
from deposits, own capital and the money market. When 
making decisions, banks are bound by the regulatory 
capital requirements and risk weights imposed by 
the Basel accords. Banks act in a partial equilibrium 
monopolistic competition environment, where decisions 
concerning interest rates on time deposits and on loans 
are based upon their analysis of the equilibrium interest 
rate in both loan and deposit markets. In this setting the 
transmission of monetary policy into bank lending and 
portfolio composition is examined.
The model developed in the present study is a two 
period extension of the previous work conducted by 
Kishan and Opiela (2000) and Baglioni (2007). Banks 
start their first period with an exogenous own capital 
endowment. The amount of equity in the second period is 
not fixed, but can actually be influenced by the investment 
decisions made during the first period. By decreasing 
(increasing) risk today, the banks have a lower (higher) 
amount of equity available tomorrow in case of success. 
Therefore, the introduction of a new capital requirement 
for today induces lower risks (higher risks) tomorrow 
depending upon whether banks are taking risks to 
maximize profits tomorrow.
During the first period, each bank observes the 
demand for deposits and the demand for loans directed at 
their own bank. Based upon this information, the banks 
decide how much to borrow from the money market, 
how much to reward deposits and how much to charge 
for loans, effectively choosing their preferred position in 
these idiosyncratic demand curves. 
During the second period, loans are repaid (or 
defaulted upon) and risky securities yield their return.
Meanwhile, banks must pay back their depositors and 
also what was borrowed from the money market. If any 
money is left over, that constitutes the own capital of the 
bank for next period’s exercise.3
THE BALANCE SHEET CONSTRAINT
The model is built on the definition of the balance sheet 
of each bank, which equates the following assets and 
liabilities:
 Rjt + Sjt + Ljt = Djt + Tjt + Bjt + Kjt (1)
On the asset side, R denotes required reserves, S 
denotes securities, and L denotes loans. On the liability 
side, D denotes demand deposits, T denotes time deposits, 
K denotes the bank’s own capital, and B denotes the 
interbank borrowing. All items have subscripts ( jt)
because the present study utilizes a panel structure, where 
the subscript ( j) identifies the bank and the subscript (t) 
identifies the period.
The equality of balance sheets in equation 1 is 
an ex-ante definition: At the first period banks were 
given the choice of choosing time deposit and loan 
rates; and the choice of how much to borrow from the 
money market, the amount of loans issued, the amount 
of securities bought and reserves set aside must obey 
this relationship. At the end of the second period, some 
loans may be defaulted and the amount of equity is not 
fixed, but can actually be influenced by the investment 
decisions made in the first period. Therefore, the 
equality of this equation will no longer hold. But it 
must hold ex-ante. 
RESERVES
Banks do not hold excess reserves, only required reserves. 
As in Kishan and Opiela (2000), the required reserves are 
assumed to be a constant fraction α of demand deposits 
at each period t = 1,2 period:
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 Rjt = αDjt (2)
The reserve requirement fraction α is set by the 
central bank at 4 percent of demand deposits. Required 
reserves receive no returns.
SECURITIES
Banks also hold marketable financial assets, such as 
government and private bonds; and bills. Banks are 
assumed to hold securities if it is costly to liquidate loans 
in the short run, as opposed to Kashyap and Stein (1995).
Furthermore, banks may hold a buffer stock of securities 
to insulate themselves, at least partially (Stein 1998). The 
rate of return on securities, rst, is given by:
 rst = e0 + e1it + vt (3)
The current inter-bank or money market rate it has a 
direct influence on the current rate of return on securities, 
where e0 and e1 are parameters and vt is a random error 
term that summarizes all other factors influencing the rate 
of return. Other factors in the random error can include 
changes in the total factor productivity of firms.4 The 
money market rate, it, is observed at the start of period 
1 before decisions are made, but the error term is only 
realised at the end of period 2 after the decisions are 
made.
LOANS
The loan market is in monopolistic competition, where 
each bank sets its own loan interest rate, taking as given 
the ‘market’ interest rate, rLjt. The demand for loans faced 
by bank j in period t is given by
 Ljt = b0 – b1(rLjt – r-Lt) – b2r-Lt + vjt (4)
where is an error term. Individuals and firms demand 
loans based on the loan rate and incur some costs when 
changing banks, which generates local monopoly power 
for each bank. The error term is not correlated with other 
variables and is observed at the start of each period so that 
the exact location of the demand curve is known and can 
be explored by the bank. The monopolistic competition 
assumption follows Baglioni (2007).
Loans are subject to ex-post default. The default 
rate is a random variable with an expected value (1-q). 
The bank, therefore, expects to recover qL (performing 
loans) of the loans made.
DEPOSITS
The banks’ sources of funds are deposits, equity and 
money market borrowing. Demand and time deposits are 
separated and demand deposits are assumed to be outside 
of the control of any bank. All deposits are returned to 
customers at the end of period 2.
The demand for demand deposits faced by bank j 
during each period is inversely related to the interbank 
rate and varies over time by error term εt, the realization 
of which is observed at the start of each period.5
 Djt = c0 – c1it + εt (5)
The interest rate paid on demand deposits, rDt, is 
determined as given by interbank rates or mean market 
interest rates; and is exogenous to commercial banks. 
Every bank has the same interest rate on demand 
deposits.
The demand for time deposits directed at bank j is 
a function of the spread between banks j’s rate, rTjt, and 
the average rate in the market. This demand varies over 
time by error term ωjt, the realization of which is known 
at the start of each period before decisions are made. If 
banks want to attract more time deposits, they must raise 
interest rates to increase their market share. The demand 
for time deposits faced by a bank is given by
 Tjt = d0 + d1(rTjt – r-Tt) + d2r-Tt + ωjt (6)
BORROWING
Banks’ borrowing is understood as borrowing from 
the interbank market or money market. The cost of 
borrowing is assumed to depend upon the policy rate, 
which originates in the interbank market and risk free 
market repurchase agreements (repos).
CAPITAL
The initial level of equity Kjt is exogenously determined, 
either being derived from retained earnings or capital 
injections and profits of the previous period. The use of 
equity capital must conform with capital requirement 
regulations imposed by Basel I, which limits the bank’s 
exposure to non performing loans and securities. The 
reserves requirement is the amount that should be 
possessed by banks before loans and securities. This 
constraint always binds, as demonstrated below. The 
capital constraint is given by
 Kjt ≥ μ(Rjt + δSSjt + δLLjt) (7)
This equation states that banks are subject to 
risk-based capital requirements, where μ measures the 
minimum capital requirements for reserves, securities 
and loans. In accordance with Basel I, all loans and 
securities in the private sector are given the average 
capital requirement μ = 0.08. However, under the Basel 
II regulatory constraints, a different calculation of risk-
weighted assets across loans and securities is utilized, 
which depends on the borrowers’ ratings or quality 
of portfolio held by the bank. Therefore, δS and δL are 
assumed to be the risk weights on securities and loans.6 
These risk factors are essential to banks exposed to high 
levels of risk for loans and securities. The crucial property 
here is that:
 δS, δL ≥ 1 (8)
91Two-Period Model of Bank Lending channel: Basel II Regulatory constraints
PROFIT MAXIMIZATION IN PERIOD 2
At the start of each period, banks choose the interest rate 
they offer on time deposits, rTj2, and charge on loans, rLj2, 
as well as how much is to be borrowed from the money 
market, Bj2. The model is solved backwards and the 
decision at the start of period 2 is examined first. Given 
positive capital and positive demand for deposits (no bank 
run), the bank chooses (rTj2, rLj2, Bj2) to maximize profits 
subject to the constraints and relationships described 
above. Expected profits are given by
 Eπj2 = EqrLj2qLj2 + ErSrS2Sj2 – rD2Dj2 – rTj2Tj2  
  – i2Bj2 – E1–q(1 – q)Lj2 (9)
The balance sheet relationship is an identity and 
is replaced in the objective function to eliminate S. 
Regulatory constraints under both Basel I and Basel 
II have the associated Lagrange multiplier lambda, λj2, 
defined as  = (πj2 + λj2c). The first order conditions for 
this problem, derived in the appendix, are as follows:
 
∂j2––––
∂rLj2
 = qLj2 – qb1rLj2 + reS2b1 + (1 – q)b1  
  – λj2b1(δL – δS) = 0 (10)
 
∂j2––––
∂rTj2
 = d1reS2 – Tj2 –  d1rTj2 + λj2d1δS = 0 (11)
 
∂j2––––
∂Bj2
 = reS2 – i2 + λj2δS = 0 (12)
and
 
∂j2––––
∂λj2
 = (α + (1 – α)δS)Dj2 + (δL – δS)Lj2 + δSTj2  
  + δSBj2 – ( 1–μ  – δS)Kj2 = 0 (13)
The first condition determines the value of the 
Lagrange multiplier. It is given by
 λj2 = 
i2 – reS2––––––
δS
 < 0 (14)
and is negative because the expected return on securities 
is assumed to be higher than the policy rate, i2. This shows 
that only borrowing depends on capital, since banks 
always borrow from the money market.
The first condition for the constraint is given by:
 Bj2 = ( 1–μ – δS)Kj2––δS – (α + (1 – α)δS)
Dj2––
δS
 
  – (δL – δS)
Lj2––
δS
– δS
Tj2––
δS
 (15)
The Lagrange multiplier of constraint implies that 
interbank borrowing at period two depends linearly on the 
amount of capital during the same period. This shows that 
banks will decide whether to borrow from the interbank 
market after observing the amount of capital available. 
The constraint of capital will determine the amount of 
borrowing in the money market. This strongly implies 
that the regulatory constraint always binds. If the bank has 
enough own capital to invest, it will still borrow from the 
interbank market until it has purchased enough securities 
and issued enough loans that it becomes constrained 
under the Basel II regulatory framework. This is not an 
unreasonable description of the risk taking behaviour 
observed recently throughout the international banking 
system: cheap money and toxic assets.7
The second implication of the solution is that the 
interbank rate affects the model only via the Lagrange 
multiplier. This is because the policy rate will always be 
less than the expected rate of return on securities or debt; 
and the banks always borrow since they assume the rate 
of returns are profitable.
After a substitution of terms, the following formulas 
are obtained for the optimal interest rates:
 r*Lj2 = 
[b0 + (b1 – b2)r-L2 + vj2]q – λj2b1(δL – δS) 
+ b1reS2 + (1 – q)b1––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
2qb1
 (16)
 r*Tj2 = 
[reS2 + λj2δS]d1 – d0 + (d1 – d2)r-T2 – ωj2–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
2d1
 (17)
and note that
 
∂r*Lj2–––––
∂i2
 = 
e1––
2q
 – 
(δL – δS)––––––
2q
 ∂λj2–––
∂i2
 (18)
 
∂r*Tj2–––––
∂i2
 = 
e1––
2
 + 
δS––
2
∂λj2–––
∂i2
 (19)
The Lagrange multiplier shows a negative derivative 
( ∂λj2 –––∂i2  = 
1 – e1 ––––
δS
) since the policy rate is always less 
than the expected return on securities. The Lagrange 
multiplier in period 2 demonstrates that the effect of the 
regulatory constraint is always negative. Therefore, the 
reaction of the optimal rate on loans from the change 
in policy rate is positive if δL > δS, or otherwise if 
δS > δL. This demonstrates that when the credit risk of 
loans is more than the credit risk of securities, the rate 
on loans positively reacts to the changes in policy rate 
since investment in loans are more risky than securities. 
Thus, an increasing rate of loans will reduce the amount 
of loans since investments in securities will provide 
greater returns. Otherwise, if credit risks relating to 
securities are greater than loans, the rate on loans will 
increase as the policy rate decreases. This is due to the 
fact that increasing the credit risk of securities gives more 
exposures to risk on investment in securities.Therefore, it 
is more rational for banks to decrease the rate on loans as 
the policy rate increases since the level of risk on loans 
is less than the level of risk on securities; and they will 
prefer to reduce the cost of loans in order to increase the 
amount of loans. Besides, the reaction of the optimal 
rate on time deposits is always negative if the Lagrange 
multiplier is always negative.
In addition, the binding of capital rule8always 
decreases the amount of risky loans and securities to be 
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invested. Thus, the binding of capital rule decreases the 
profit of banks due to the limited amount of assets that 
can be invested. Therefore, banks are less exposed to 
risky and default assets.
THE VALUE FUNCTION
The method of dynamic programming, as suggested by 
Bellman (1957), can be used to solve the value function. 
In order to solve the first period problem, value function 
for period 2 must be written, which is the maximized 
profit as a function of all stated variables of the problem. 
Note that at the optimum level, the regulatory constraint 
binds and is not explicitly visible in the value function.
 Vj2(Kj2, Zj2) = rLj2qLj2 + reS2Sj2 – rD2Dj2  
  – rTj2Tj2 – i2Bj2 (20)
where Kj2 = {ωj2, vj2, i2, εj2} contains the realizations of 
shocks to time deposits, loan demand, interbank rate and 
demand deposits. Securities must be replaced with the 
balance sheet identity and obtains
Vj2(Kj2, Zj2) = (qrLj2 – reS2)Lj2 + reS2Kj2 + (reS2 – i2)Bj2  
  + reS2[(1 – α)Dj2 + Tj2] – rD2Dj2  
  – rTj2Tj2 – (1 – q)Lj2 (21)
where Bj2 is a linear function of Kj2.
More importantly, the value function of period 2 can 
be decomposed into two components, which separates the 
components that depend on Kj2 from those that do not. 
Since only Bj2 depends on Kj2, the following function is 
written:
 Vj2(Kj2, Zj2) = Kj2[reS2 + (reS2 – i2)( 1––μ  – δS) 1––δS ](reS2 – i2)
  [(α +(1– α)δS) Dj2–––δS +(δL – δS) Lj2–––δS + δS Tj2–––δS ]
  + (qrLj2 – reS2)Lj2 + reS2 [(1 – α)Dj2 + Tj2] 
  – rD2Dj2 – rTj2Tj2 – (1 – q)Lj2 (22)
 Vj2(Kj2, Zj2) = Г1Kj2 + Г2 (23)
where,
 Г1 = [reS2 + (reS2 – i2)( 1––μ  – δS) 1––δS ] (24)
The value function is useful for the next section.
PROFIT MAXIMIZATION IN PERIOD 1
The profit function of period one is given by:
 πj1 = (qrLj1 – rS1 – (1 – q))Lj1 + rS1Kj1 + (rS1 – i1)Bj1
 + rS1[(1 – α)Dj1 + Tj1] – rD1Dj1 – rTj1Tj1 (25)
and subject to constraint:
 Kj1 ≥ μ(Rj1 + δSSj1 + δLLj1) (26)
Vj1(Kj1, Zj1) is defined as the maximized value of the 
objective function at time 1 given an initial capital stock 
of assets Kj1. Vj2(Kj2, Zj2) is the maximized value of the 
objective function at time 2 given an initial capital stock 
of assets Kj2. In other words, the objective function for 
the two-period problem is defined at the start of period 
one and greatly simplified in a recursive form using the 
Bellman equation as follows:
 Vj1(Kj1, Zj1) = maxrLj1, rTj1, Bj1 πj1 + βVj2(Kj2, Zj2) (27)
where the realized πj1 is equal to Kj2.
This allows the Value Function in period 1 to be 
rewritten as
 Vj1(Kj1, Zj1) = maxrLj1, rTj1, Bj1 πj1 + β(Г1πj2, Г2) (28)
The next step is to maximize this objective function 
with respect to rTj1, rLj1, Bj1. Then, take a derivative of 
the entire right hand side (RHS) of the Bellman operator, 
where the solution maximization of the value function 
of period 1 is given as follows:
∂πj1–––
∂πLj1
 = [b0q + (b1 – b2)r-L1q – 2b1rLj1q + vj1q + b1rS1 + (1 – q)b1 – (μ – 1––δS )b1rS1(δL – δS) ][1 + βГ1] = 0 (29)
∂πj1–––
∂πTj1
 = [d1rS1 + (d1 – d2)r-T1 – d0  – 2d1rTj1 – ωj1 + rS1(μ – 1–δS)d1δS][1 + βГ1] = 0 (30)
∂πj1–––
∂βLj1
 = [(rS1 – i1) + rS1(μ – 1––δS )δS][1 + βГ1] = 0 (31)
The derivative of rTj1, rLj1, Bj1 in the first period is 
realized with the addition of the expected value of the 
second period, which depends on the first period. In this 
case, β is a discount factor that can be formulated as 
1
–––
i+ρ
, 
in which ρ is a premium rate and i is an interbank rate.
Optimal interest rates in period 1
r*Lj1 = 
[b0q + (b1 – b2)r-L1q + vj1q + b1rS1 + (1 – q)b1 – (μ – 1––δS )b1rS1(δL – δS)]_________________________________
2b1q
 (34)
r*Tj1 = 
[(d1 – d2)r-T1 – d0 – ωj1+ d1rS1 + rS1(μ – 1––δS )dLδS]___________________________________
2d1
 (35)
and note that
 
∂r*Lj1––––
∂i1
 = 
e1––
2q
 – e1(μ – 1––δS )(
(δL – δS)––––––
2q ) = 0 (36)
 
∂r*Tj1–––
∂i1
 = 
e1––
2
 + e1(μ – 1––δS )(
δS––
2 ) = 0 (37)
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The effect of regulatory constraint in period one 
is shown by e1(μ – 1––δS ). Since μ = 0.08 is the capital 
adequacy ratio and a small percentage if compared with 
1
––
δS
, the effect of regulatory constraint is always negative. 
During this first period, the constraint of capital plays an 
important role in influencing the response of the interest 
rates to loans and time deposits. If regulatory constraint 
is assumed to always be negative, the response of interest 
rate on loans during period 1 to a policy rate has a positive 
effect if δL > δS, otherwise if δL < δS. The first period 
predictions are similar to the second period predictions 
without taking into account the constraint. However, 
only the constraint makes the predictions difference. In 
addition, if the effect of regulatory constraint is assumed 
to be negative, the response of interest rates on time 
deposits during period 1 to policy rate is negatively 
predicted. Only the risk factor of securities influences 
the optimal rate of time deposits. 
The regulatory constraint in periods 1 and 2 are 
predicted depending upon the regulatory parameters and 
constraints for both periods. The impact of interest rates 
on loans and time deposits to a policy rate more or less 
occur during the first period when banks face a shock of 
capital rule from the start of period 1.
CONCLUSIONS
The overall result of the predictions demonstrates how 
essential it is to analyse, in detail, a dynamic model of 
a bank lending channel in a monopolistic competition 
market. During period one, the regulatory constraint 
always demonstrates a negative value. This implication 
is true for both periods of time predicted. In other words, 
the prediction of period one and two are shown to have 
the same effect and the only difference is the constraint. 
The impact of interest rates on loans and time deposits 
on a policy rate more or less occur during the first period 
when banks face a shock of capital rule from the start 
of period one. Thus, the effect of optimal rates on the 
policy rate is felt greater or less during the first period 
than the second period, which means tightening capital 
requirements increases or decreases the risks of assets 
and banks taking a higher or lower risk during the first 
period than during the second period. This is consistent 
with the analysis performed by Ahmad (2006). 
Two principal limitations exist for the present study. 
First, data are not calibrated or estimated in accordance 
with the predictions of the present study. However, the 
research will be expanded by calibrating and estimating a 
banks data from the first period of implementation of the 
Basel II regulatory constraints until more recent years in 
order to determine the effect of new regulatory constraints 
on the optimal decisions predicted in the present study. 
The effect of new regulatory constraints will depend upon 
the regulatory parameters predicted in the first and second 
periods. Second, the model presented in the present study 
is only a partial equilibrium model. Therefore, the results 
can be of greater interest if the role of other agents is 
included, such as government, households and firms,in 
order to obtain a full general equilibrium.
NOTES
1 Exposure to sovereign, and so on as stated in the Basel II 
regulatory constraint.
2  Sources: Prudential Financial Policy Department, Central 
Bank of Malaysia.
3  If no money is left over, the bank is extinguished and the 
problem ends. Limited liability exists, so bank owners 
are not forced to cover unfulfilled claims. However, this 
problem is side stepped by assuming that the distributions 
of the relevant random variables are such that some 
positive profit will always occur in period 1. This issue is 
discussed further in the author’s PhD thesis (on file with the 
author), which demonstrates the difference of capital ratios 
and capital adequacy ratios (known as excess of capital) 
for all banks (to show whether banks are well-capitalized 
or less-capitalized); and also in the appendix of descriptive 
analysis that demonstrates that all banks have a positive 
equity. If the excess of capital is positive (negative), banks 
are classified as well capitalized (less capitalized). While 
this does not indicate that those banks with a negative 
excess of capital have negative equity, their capital ratio 
is less than their capital adequacy ratio (8%).
4  The present study assumes that vt ~ N(0,Ω); where Ω is 
a scalar. The interest rate on private securities reflects the 
production possibilities frontier and is also assumed to 
respond to monetary policy via the interbank rate.
5  The shock  does not include bank run, in which case the 
error will only give a positive value. So the distribution 
is only positive and εt ~N(0,Ω) where Ω is a scalar.
6  In Basel II, the delta can be varied because assets depend 
on credit risk. Therefore δL, δS,>1, which can be divided 
into high and low credit risks concerning loans and 
securities.
7  Toxic asset is a popular term for certain financial assets 
whose value has fallen significantly and for which a 
functioning market no longer exists. Such assets cannot 
be sold at a price satisfactory to the holder.
8 The binding capital rule refers to the capital regulatory 
constraint regulated by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) in Basel II.
9  This configuration is close to the average configuration 
of the balance sheet in the data of the present study. It is 
not identical because the balance sheet in the model is a 
simplification of the actual data.
REFERENCES
Ahmad, R. 2006. Capital requirement and financial regulations 
in banking: Are they effective? Banker’s Journal Malaysia 
130: 13-21.
Baglioni, A. 2007. Monetary Policy Transmission under 
different banking structures: The role of capital and 
heterogeneity. International Review of Economics and 
Finance 16: 78-100.
94 Jurnal Ekonomi Malaysia 48(1)
Bellman, R. 1957. Dynamic Programming.New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
Blum, J. 1999. Do capital adequacy requirements reduce risks 
in banking? Journal of Banking and Finance 23: 755-771.
Boivin, J., Kiley, M. and Mishkin, F. 2010. How has the 
monetary transmission mechanism evolved over time? 
NBER Working paper Series 15879.
Honda, Y. 2004. Bank capital regulations and the transmission 
mechanism. Journal of Policy Modelling 26: 675-688.
Jacques, K. T. 2008. Capital shocks, bank asset allocation, and 
the revised Basel Accord. Review of Financial Economics 
17: 79-91.
Kashyap, A. K. & Stein, J. C. 1995. Impact of monetary policy 
on bank balance sheets. cornegie-Rochester Series on 
Public Policy 42: 151-195.
Kashyap, A. K., & Stein, J. C. 2004. Cyclical implications of 
the Basel II capital standards. Economic Perspectives, 
Federal Reserve Bank of chicago Q I: 18-31.
Kishan, R. P. & Opiela, T. P. 2000. Bank size, bank capital and 
the bank lending channel. Journal of Money, credit and 
Banking 32: 121-141.
Miyake, A. & Nakamura, T. 2007. A dynamic analysis of an 
economy with banking optimization and capital adequacy 
regulations. Journal of Economics and Business 59: 14-27.
Naceur, S. B. & Kandil, M. 2009. The impact of capital 
requirements on banks’ cost of intermediation and 
performance: The case of Egypt. Journal of Economics 
and Business 61: 70-89.
Repullo, R. & Suarez J. 2004. Loan pricing under Basel capital 
requirements. Journal of Financial Intermediation 13: 
496-521.
Stein, J. C. 1998. An adverse selection model of bank asset 
and liability management with implications for the 
transmission of monetary policy. RAND Journal of 
Economics 29(3): 466-86.
Fathin Faizah Said
Pusat Pengajian Ekonomi
Fakulti Ekonomi dan Pengurusan
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia
43600 UKM Bangi
Selangor D.E.
fatin@ukm.edu.my
95Two-Period Model of Bank Lending channel: Basel II Regulatory constraints
APPENDIX A
PROFIT MAXIMIZATION
Profit Maximization of Second Period, Given Kj2 > 0
The objective function is rewritten as
 j2 = [EqrLj2 qLj2 + ErSrS2Sj2 – rD2Dj2 – rTj2Tj2 – i2Bj2 – E1–q(1 – q)Lj2 + λj2{μj2(Rj2 + δSSj2 + δLLj2) – Kj2} ]  (39)
where λj2 ≤ 0. Now the balance sheet equality is used to 
eliminate securities:
 Sj2 = (1 – α)Dj2 + Tj2 + Kj2 + Bj2 – Lj2 (40)
Capital constraint becomes:
 
Kj2––
μ  ≥ αDj2 + (1 – α)δSDj2 + δSTj2 + δSKj2 + δSBj2 
  – δSLj2 + δLLj2 (41)
 (α + (1 – α)δS)Dj2 + (δL – δS)Lj2 + δSTj2 + δSBj2
   ≤ ( 1–μ – δS)Kj2 (42)
Therefore:
 j2 = [ EqrLj2 qLj2 + ErSrS2Sj2 – rD2Dj2 – rTj2Tj2 – i2Bj2 – E1–q(1 – q)Lj2+ λj2{(α + (1 – α)δS)Dj2 + (δL – δS)Lj2 + δSTj2 + δSBj2 – ( 1–μ – δS)Kj2 }]  (43)
Now, the following first order conditions are 
obtained:
 ∂j2––––
∂rLj2
 = qLj2 – qb1rLj2 + reS2b1 + (1 – q)b1 
  – λj2b1(δL – δS) = 0 (44)
 ∂j2––––
∂rTj2
 = d1reS2 – Tj2 – d1rTj2 + λj2d1δS = 0 (45)
 ∂j2––––
∂rBj2
 = reS2 – i2 + λj2δS = 0 (46)
and
 ∂j2––––
∂rBj2
 = (α + (1 – α)δS)Dj2 + (δL – δS)Lj2 + δSTj2
  + δSBj2 – ( 1–μ – δS)Kj2 = 0 (47)
Capital constraint is always binding, λj2 ≠ 0:
 r*Lj2 = 
[b0 + (b1 – b2)r-L2 + vj2]q – λj2b1(δL – δS) 
+ b1reS2 + (1 – q)b1––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
2qb1
 (48)
 r*Tj2 = 
[reS2 + λj2δS]d1 – d0 + (d1 – d2)r-T2 – ωj2–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
2d1
 (49)
 λj2 = 
i2 – reS2––––––
δS
 < 0 (50)
And note that
 
∂r*Lj2–––––
∂i2
 = 
e1––
2q
 – 
(δL – δS)––––––
2q
 ∂λj2–––
∂i2
 (51)
 
∂r*Tj2–––––
∂i2
 = 
e1––
2
 + 
δS––
2
∂λj2–––
∂i2
 (52)
CONSISTENCY
It is important to check for consistency. Are these rates 
positive and is rLj2 > rTj2? The assumption is reasonable 
that banks always offer the rate of loans higher than the 
rate of time deposits to ensure that banks have sufficient 
income or returns to continue operating.
 rLj2 = 
[b0 + (b1 – b2)r-L2 + vj2]q – λj2b1(δL – δS) + b1reS2 
+ (1 – q)b1––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
2qb1
 
 rTj2 = 
[reS2 + λj2δS]d1 – d0 + (d1 – d2)r-T2 – ωj2–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
2d1
 
First, the market rates are required.
If all banks are assumed to be equal except for their 
draws of the shock ωj2, and E(ωj2) = ω-j2, the following 
occurs:
 r-T2 = 
[reS2 + λj2δS]d1 – d0 + (d1 – d2)r-T2 – ωj2–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
2d1
 
 r-Tj2 = 
[reS2 + λj2δS]d1 – d0 – ω-j2––––––––––––––––––
d1 + d2
 
 r-T2 = 
[reS2 + λj2δS]d1––––––––––
d1 + d2
 – 
d0 + ω-j2––––––
d1 + d2
 r-T2 = 
d1–––––
d1 + d2
 [i2] – 
d0 + ω-j2––––––
d1 + d2
 
where reS2  is the expected rate on securities.
The following realized rate is obtained:
rTj2 = 
[reS2 + λj2δS]d1 – d0 – ωj2––––––––––––––––––
2d2
 
 +
1
–
2
(d1 – d2)––––––
d1 + d2 [reS2 + λj2δS – d0 + ω
-
j2––––––
d1 + d2 ]
rTj2 = [ d1––––––(d1 + d2)[reS2 + λj2δS – d0––d1 ] – 1––2d1 [ωj2 + d0 + d2 ––––––d1 ω-j2] 
The same procedure is performed for the loan rate:
r-L2 = 
b0+(b1 – b2)r-L2 + v-j2––––––––––––––––
2b1
 + 
reS2
––
2q  – 
λj2b1(δL–δS)––––––––––
2q
+
(1– q)
–––––
2q
 r-L2 = 
[b0+ v-j2]q – λj2b1(δL–δS) + b1reS2 + (1– q)b1–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
qb1 + qb2
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r-L2 = 
[b0 + v-j2]–––––––
(b1 + b2)
 – 
λj2––
q
b1(δL–δS)–––––––
(b1 + b2)
 + 
b1reS1–––––––
(b1 + b2)
+ 
(1– q)b1–––––––
(b1 + b2)
Finally, we determine whether the realized interest 
rates chosen by the bank are both positive and whether 
(or under what conditions) the loan rate is bigger than 
the time deposit rate.
The following realized rate is obtained:
 rLj2 = 
b1––––––
(b1 + b2)
 [ b0––b1  – λj2––q  (δL – δS) + reS2 + (1 – q)] 
  + [ 1––2b1(vj2 + (b1 – b2)–––––––(b1 + b2)  v-2)]
First note that if (δL > δS) and i2 < reS2, then r-L2 > 0. 
But, on the other hand, r-T2 will be positive if d0 is small 
enough. Both rates appear to be positive without much 
problem. Now, is rL2 > rT2?
 r-L2 – r-T2 = [ (b1 + v-2)–––––––(b1 + b2)  + d0 + ω-–––––d1 + d2] – λj2 [(δL – δS)––––––q b1––––––(b1 + b2)
  + δS d1–––––d1 + d2] + [ b1––––––(b1 + b2) – d1–––––d1 + d2] reS2 
  + [ b1––––––(b1 + b2) (1 – q)]
and this is the case.As long as [ b1–––––––(b1 + b2)  – d1–––––––(d1 + d2) ] is 
not too negative, the desired result, which is , should be 
obtained.
OPTIMAL BORROWING
The binding constraint and the balance sheet can be used 
to find the expression for optimal borrowing:
 
Kj2–––
μ
 = Rj2 + δSSj2 + δLLj2
 Sj2 = (1 – α)Dj2 + Tj2 + Kj2 + Bj2 – Lj2
and the following equation is obtained
 Bj2 = ( 1––μ  – δS) Kj2–––δS  – (α + (1 – α)δS) Dj2–––δS  
  – (δL – δS) 
Lj2–––
δS
 – δS 
Tj2–––
δS
where T and L are functions of the optimal rates, which, in 
turn, are functions of the Lagrange Multiplier.It is useful 
to determine whether suitable values for the different 
variables (R,S,L,D,T,K,B) yield acceptable values for 
the missing parameters (δS, δL). In fact, some freedom 
exists since only the Basel constraint must be satisfied. 
The following table illustrates two combinations of deltas 
that are consistent with the Basel constraint for a given 
configuration of the balance sheet:9
IMPLIED SECURITIES
Given B, S can be constructed as:
 Sj2 = (1 – α)Dj2 + Tj2 + Kj2 – Lj2 + (1–μ – δS) Kj2––δS  
  – (α + (1 – α)δS) 
Dj2–––
δS
 – (δL – δS) 
Lj2–––
δS
 – δS
Tj2––
δS
 Sj2 = [ 1–μ 1––δS ] Kj2 –[ α––δS ] Dj2 – [ δL––δS ] Lj2
and the size of S is determined by the size of loans since 
the first 3 terms are positive. This quantity will be positive 
because the combinations of the (b,c,d) parameters 
are such that the balance sheet configurations can be 
generated similar to those in Table 1. In such a case, S 
will take that value by consistency.
THE VALUE FUNCTION OF SECOND PERIOD
The value function for period 2, in which B and the 
optimal rates are linear functions of the policy rate, is 
written as follows:
 Vj2(Kj2, Zj2) = rLj2qLj2 + reS2Sj2 – rDj2Dj2  – rTj2Tj2 – i2Bj2 
  – (1 – q) Lj2 (53)
where Zj2 = {ωj2, vj2, i2, εj2} contains the realizations of 
shocks to time deposits, loan demand, interbank rate and 
demand deposits. Securities must be replaced with the 
balance sheet identity, which obtains:
 Vj2(Kj2, Zj2) = (qrLj2 – reS2)Lj2 + reS2Kj2 + (reS2 – i2)Bj2 
  + reS2[(1– α)Dj2 + Tj2] – rD2Dj2 – rTj2Tj2
  – (1– q) Lj2 (54)
where Bj2 is a linear function of Kj2.
More important, the value function of period 2 can 
be decomposed into two components by separating the 
components that depend on Kj2 from those that do not. 
The following equation can be written since only Bj2 
depends on Kj2:
Vj2(Kj2, Zj2) = Kj2[reS2 + (reS2 – i2) ( 1–μ – δS) 1––δS ] (reS2 – i2)
 [(α + (1– α)δS) Dj2–––δS  + (δL – δS) Lj2––δS  + δSTj2––δS ] 
 + (qrLj2 – reS2)Lj2 + reS2[(1– α)Dj2 + Tj2] – rD2Dj2 
 – rTj2Tj2 – (1– q) Lj2 (55)
 Vj2(Kj2, Zj2) = Г1Kj2 + Г2 (56)
where,
 Г1 = [reS2 + (reS2 – i2) ( 1–μ – δS) 1––δS ]
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The value function is useful for the next section.
Profit Maximization in Period 1, Given Kj1 > 0
The profit function of period one is given by:
 πj1 = (qrLj1 – rS1 – (1 – q))Lj1 + rS1Kj1 + (rS1 – i1)Bj1 
  + rS1[(1 – α)Dj1 + Tj1] – rD1Dj1 – rTj1Tj1 (57)
and subject to constraint:
 Kj1 ≥ (Rj1 + δSSj1 + δLLj1) (58)
Now the balance sheet equality is used to eliminate 
securities:
Sj1 = (1 – α)Dj1 + Tj1 + Kj1 + Bj1 – Lj1
The constraint in (3.58) becomes:
 Kj1 = (μ – 1–δS)[(α + (1 – α)δS) Dj1 + (δL – δS)Lj1 
+ δSTj1 + δSBj1]  (59)
The objective function for the 2-period problem 
defined at the start of period one is then given by the 
Bellman equation:
 Vj1(Kj1, Zj1) = maxrLj1, rTj1, Bj1 πj1 + βVj2(Kj2, Zj2) (60)
where the realized πj2 is equal to Kj2.
This allows the Value Function in period oneto be 
rewritten as
       Vj1(Kj1, Zj1) = maxrLj1, rTj1, Bj1 πj1 + β(Г1πj2 + Г2) (61)
The next step is to maximize this objective function 
with respect to rTj1, rLj1, Bj1. Then, take a derivative of the 
entire right hand side (RHS) of Bellman operator, where 
the solution maximization of the value function of period 
1 is given as below:
 
∂RHS
–––––
∂rLj1
, 
∂RHS
–––––
∂rTj1
, 
∂RHS
–––––
∂Bj1
The differentiation reduces to
 
∂πj1–––
∂rLj1
(1 + βГ1) = 0
 
∂πj1–––
∂rTj1
(1 + βГ1) = 0
 
∂πj1–––
∂Bj1
(1 + βГ1) = 0
So, the following derivatives are shown:
∂πj1–––
∂rLj1 [b0q + (b1 – b2)r-L1q – 2b1rLj1q + vj1q + b1rS1 + (1 – q)b1 – (μ – 1–δS ) b1rS1(δL – δS) ][1 + βГ1] = 0 (62)
∂πj1–––
∂rTj1 [ d1rS1 + (d1 – d2)r-T1 – d0 – 2d1rTj1 – ωj1 + rS1 (μ – 1–δS ) d1δS][1 + βГ1] = 0 (63)
∂πj1–––
∂Bj1 [(rS1 – i1) + rS1 (μ – 1–δS )][1 + βГ1] = 0 (64)
The derivative of rTj1, rLj1, Bj1 during the first period 
is realized with the addition of the expected value of the 
second period, which depends upon the first period. In 
this case, β is a discount factor that can be formulated as 
1
–––
i + ρ
, in which ρ is a premium rate and i is an interbank 
rate.
OPTIMAL INTEREST RATES IN PERIOD 1
 r*Lj1 = 
[b0q + (b1 – b2)r-L1q + vj1q + b1rS1+ (1 – q)b1  – (μ – 1––δS ) b1rS1(δL – δS) ] –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
2b1q
 (65)
 r*Tj1 = 
[ (d1 – d2)r-T1 – d0 – ωj1 + d1rS1 + rS1 (μ – 1––δS ) d1δS]
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
2d1
 
  (66)
and note that
 
∂r*Lj1––––
∂i1
 = 
e1––
2q
 – e1(μ – 1––δS )(
(δL – δS)––––––
2q ) = 0 (67)
 
∂r*Tj1–––
∂i1
 = 
e1––
2
 + e1(μ – 1––δS )(
δS––
2 ) = 0 (68)

